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SUMMARY 
 
The growth of interconnection between national electricity markets is key to the development 
and competitive efficiency of the Single EU Market for Electricity. However, in parallel with 
the development of the Single Market, a growing number of EU Member States have 
implemented ± or are in the process of developing ± national Capacity Mechanisms in order 
to ensure future security of supply, which may distort the cross-border trade of energy across 
interconnectors and reduce total welfare. In particular, the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) 
legislative package recently brought in by the UK government introduced a Capacity Market 
(in which two rounds of auctions have taken place to date) for the provision of generation 
capacity from 2018. In order to ensure that such national markets do not distort the wider 
energy market, it is important that the role of cross-border capacity, and the availability of 
interconnector capacity, is correctly consolidated into such mechanisms. In the first annual 
GB auction the net contribution of interconnection was included on a conservative basis 
informed by historical data, and while interconnectors have since been permitted to bid into 
the Capacity Market at a de-rated value (in a similar manner to domestic generation), 
generators in other markets are still not able to explicitly participate. This may continue to 
introduce market distortions and adversely impact both short-term dispatch and long-term 
investment decisions in both the GB and neighbouring markets. A number of routes are 
available to resolve this through a mechanism to permit cross-border participation of 
generators, but this requires resolution of a number of complicating factors, not least a means 
for properly allocating transmission capacity without introducing further distortions to the 
energy market. Alternative solutions could be enacted at an EU-level, such as through the 
alignment of Capacity Mechanisms to a common model, or the introduction of an EU-wide 
single Capacity Mechanism, but the current regulatory focus appears to remain on resolution 
of such issues at a national level. 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Capacity Market, Cross-border Trade, Interconnectors, Generation Adequacy, Network Adequacy 
 
 
UXHG¶$UWRLV)-75008 PARIS         C5-212         CIGRE 2016 
http : //www.cigre.org      
  2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The realisation of interconnector capacity is vital for the creation of a single EU market in 
electricity. Historically across Europe, transmission interconnections between national 
systems have been developed to promote security of supply, but increasingly have taken on a 
wider role in order to promote competition, trade and an increase in overall welfare across EU 
Member States
1
 [1]. A shortage of interconnection capacity creates barriers to trade, and so 
the European Commission has been taking steps ± most significantly through the Third 
Energy Package of 2009 [2] ± to promote investment in new cross-border connections. The 
Energy Union package of 2015 refers to desirable levels of interconnection of 10% and 15% 
by 2020 and 2030 respectively, although there is no proposal for these targets to be mandatory 
[3]. 
 
However, a number of EU Member States have, in recognition that existing energy markets 
may not provide adequate levels of security (in terms of generation adequacy, implemented 
µFDSDFLW\ PHFKDQLVPV¶ ZKLFK UHPXQHUDWH JHQHUDWRUV or Demand Side Response (DSR) for 
committing to be available to generate across some future time horizon. EU Member States 
which have established, or are seeking to establish, capacity mechanisms include Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, The Republic of Ireland
2
, Italy, The Netherlands, Poland, 
Spain and the United Kingdom
2
 [4].  Increased interconnection also exposes inefficient 
generation to market forces, resulting in plant closure, which can further impact security of 
supply and incentivise the use of capacity mechanisms. Such mechanisms can take a variety 
of forms, with the European Commission recognising six categories within two broad types 
[5]: 
 
1. Targeted mechanisms where support is given to additional capacity expected to be required 
on top of what is provided by the market: 
 
x Tender: where a beneficiary of a tender receives public financing for the construction 
of a power plant; 
x Reserve: where contracted capacity is held in reserve outside the market and only 
activated where necessary; 
x Targeted capacity payment: where a price set by a central body is paid to a subset of 
capacity in the market (such as a specific technology type); 
 
2. Market-wide mechanisms where support is provided to all (or the majority of) providers of 
capacity in the market: 
 
x Central buyer: where a volume of capacity required is set and a market determines the 
price at which this is provided through a central bidding process; 
x De-central obligation: where an obligation is placed on market participants (such as 
retailers) to contract sufficient capacity to cover their demand; 
x Capacity payment: A price for capacity expected to achieve sufficient investment is 
fixed, and the market responds with a variable volume. 
                                                 
1
 In the GB market, however, development was initially driven by trading opportunities. 
2
 The Republic of Ireland is integrated into a Single Electricity Market (SEM) with Northern Ireland, a territory 
of the United Kingdom, covering the entire geographical island of Ireland. The electricity market of Great 
Britain is discussed within this paper, which does not include Northern Ireland, but the body responsible for 
setting the energy policy of Great Britain is the Government of the United Kingdom. 
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As part of the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) implemented by the UK Government in 
2014, a Capacity Market was introduced for the Electricity Market of Great Britain which 
broadly follows the Central Buyer methodology, and the design was accepted by the EU 
Commission as being within State Aid rules. To date two annual auctions have taken place, 
for the provision of capacity from 2018 onwards. 
 
This paper evaluates the goals and design of the GB Capacity Market, and in particular 
focuses on how the implementation has treated interconnector capacity, in order to determine 
WKH 0HFKDQLVP¶V LPSDFW RQ LQWHUFRQQHFWRU GHYHORSPHQW DQG WKH FRQYHUJHQFH RI the GB 
electricity market with the Single Market. 
 
 
BACKGROUND TO THE GB CAPACITY MECHANISM 
The early attractiveness of gas generation and slow growth in electricity demand helped to 
maintain adequate capacity margins in the UK after liberalisation in 1989, but the last decade 
has seen the margin eroded and confidence in capacity adequacy has reduced for several 
reasons [6]: 
 
x Age and environmental concerns (particularly the EU Large Combustion Plant 
Directive and Industrial Emissions Directive) leading to widespread retirement of coal 
plants; 
x Nuclear plants being retired at the end of their operational lifespans; 
x Rising and volatile gas prices deterring new gas plant; 
x A policy-driven uptake in renewable and intermittent low-carbon generation; 
x Uncertain trends in electricity demand. 
 
Figure 1 ± Forecast demand and generation capacities for the last 6 GB Winter Outlook reports from 
National Grid [8]. The Mid-Winter generation capacity is the declared amount of available generation 
capacity at the beginning of the season. 
 
In the energy-only market introduced in GB under the New Electricity Trading Arrangements 
of 2001, the expectation was that capacity adequacy would be maintained by electricity prices 
rising if the market anticipates an impending shortage of capacity ± WKH ³SHDN ORDGSULFLQJ
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WKHRU\´+RZHYHULWKDVSURYHQGLIILFXOWIRUJHQHUDWRUVWREDVHPDMRUFDSLWDOLQYHVWPHQWVRQ
the basis of high prices in periods of supply scarcity due to both operational risks and an 
uncertain political climate [7], as well as the impact on market prices from increasing 
volumes of zero marginal cost renewable generation. Figure 1 below shows the reduction in 
capacity against forecast demand over the last 6 Winter Outlook reports from National Grid.  
 
The UK Energy Act 2013 set out a package of legislation for the Electricity Market Reform 
(EMR), which includes long-term Contracts for Difference for low-carbon generation, and a 
Capacity Market (the first such to be in place since the Pool
3
 was replaced). 
 
 
GB CAPACITY MARKET DESIGN 
$QDXFWLRQLVFRQGXFWHGDQQXDOO\IRUGHOLYHU\LQ\HDUV¶WLPHLHWKH7-4 auction was 
for capacity delivery in 2018/19 and onwards. Existing generators and DSR are only eligible 
for one-year agreements for capacity, whereas new-build generators may be able to establish 
agreements for up to 15 years. Generators requiring substantial refurbishment may negotiate 
agreements for up to 3 years. The auction is technology-neutral other than in applying a de-
rating factor to each technology according to its likely contribution to security of supply at 
time of system stress. 
 
The parameters for an auction are provided by the Secretary of State, normally informed by 
the annual electricity capacity report and an estimate of demand-side response capacity, which 
are typically commissioned from the System Operator, and the reliability standard set by 
legislation. These parameters include: 
x the demand curve 
x the target capacity 
x the price cap 
x the price-taker threshold 
 
The electricity capacity report includes a forecast of how much of the peak demand for 
electricity will be met by interconnector capacity, but the overall recommendation is intended 
to be technology-neutral. 
 
In order to participate in the auction, bidders must undergo a pre-qualification assessment 5 
months ahead of the auction which determines their eligibility to participate (based on such 
items as their historically metered data and their credit status), and the de-rated capacity 
(calculated by technology class) which they are eligible to bid into the auction. Generators 
receiving support for low-carbon generation are not eligible to participate.  
 
The market is conducted as a pay-as-clear Dutch auction, starting at the price cap (£75/kW in 
the auctions to date) and reduced progressively in £5/kW bands until the capacity remaining 
intersects with the demand curve. A full description of the auction process is available in [9]. 
 
                                                 
3
 The Pool was the mechanism in place for the wholesale market between 1990 and 2001, acting as a compulsory 
day-ahead last-price market, and included a capacity payment based on loss of load probability. 
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CAPACITY MECHANISMS WITHIN THE EU 
 
The EU approach to capacity mechanisms has varied across legislative packages. In April 
2015, in response to the growth in national capacity mechanisms, the European Commission 
launched a state aid inquiry into their use, in order to determine whether they ensure sufficient 
electricity supply without distorting competition and trade in the Single Market. Such 
PHFKDQLVPV DUH SHUPLWWHG ZKHQ ³WKHUH LV D UHDO ULVN RI LQVXIILFLHQW HOHctricity generation 
FDSDFLW\´>10] in order to encourage new generation capacity, postpone closures of existing 
plant, or reward consumers for actions which lead to reductions in peak consumption. Design 
of such a mechanism, in addition to generic competition and market stipulations, is required 
to include: 
 
x A clear demonstration of the reasons why the market cannot be expected to deliver 
adequate capacity in the absence of intervention; 
x A description of the unit of measure for quantification of security and its method of 
calculation; 
x Assessment of the impact of variable generation (including in neighbouring systems), 
demand-side participation, and interconnectors; 
x A remuneration only for availability: that is, a payment made per MW capacity 
committed to be available, and not per MWh sold; 
x Adequate incentives to existing and future generators and allow for potentially 
different lead times for different technologies, and be open to potential aggregation of 
both demand and supply; 
x The ability for operators from other Member States to participate where it is physically 
possible for them to do so. 
 
Additionally, the mechanism should not reduce incentives to invest in interconnection 
capacity, undermine market coupling, strengthen market dominance, undermine pre-existing 
investment decisions or give preference to low-carbon generators with equivalent technical 
and economic parameters (that is, the mechanism should be distinct and separate from one 
designed to decrease the carbon intensity of generation). 
 
7KH(8UHYLHZRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶VSURJress within the Single Market [11] found 
that greater interconnection is needed, and that recent successive legislative and regulatory 
changes are of concern and interventions must be kept in line with Internal Market and State 
Aid rules. However, in July 2014, the Commission found that the proposed UK Capacity 
0DUNHW IRU *UHDW %ULWDLQ ZDV ZLWKLQ (8 VWDWH DLG UXOHV DQG ³HPEUDFHV WKH SULQFLSOHV RI
technology neutrality and competitive bidding to ensure generation adequacy at the lowest 
SRVVLEOH FRVW´ >12]. However, this decision faced some opposition, particularly from 
environmental groups, as it was viewed as a mechanism for providing preferential treatment 
to existing coal plants which might otherwise face closure, when assessed alongside the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VIUHH]HRIWKH&DUERQ3ULFH6XSSRUWin the 2014 Budget [13]. 
 
 
THE ROLE OF INTERCONNECTION 
 
EU law permits two forms of projects in the development of interconnectors: regulated 
projects implemented by national Transmission System Operators (TSOs), and for-profit 
³PHUFKDQW´ SURMHFWV LPSOHPHQted by commercial investors, approved by the national 
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regulator and the European Commission [14]. In the GB market, there are currently two 
routes for merchant interconnector investment [15]: 
 
1. 5HJXODWHG XQGHU WKH µFDS DQG IORRU¶ UHJLPH DYDLODEOH VLQFH 0D\ 2014. Under this 
route, developers identify, propose and build interconnections. Their revenue is 
regulated by both a cap and floor price. 
2. Exempted from regulatory requirements for revenue treatment, with exposure to full 
upsides and downsides of investment. 
 
The UK government does not see a formal role for itself in network planning or approval of 
interconnection beyond instituting the appropriate regulatory regime [16]. 
 
In addition to the four existent interconnectors, there are currently 6 interconnectors 
recognised by the GB regulator as being under development under the cap and floor regime, 
totalling 6.3GW, and one exempt interconnector of 1GW, as summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 - Current GB interconnection operational or under development, with the regulatory mechanism 
being pursued for interconnectors being commissioned after the introduction of Cap and Floor in 2014 
[15] 
Project Capacity 
(MW) 
Interconnected 
Market 
Commissioning 
Date 
Regulatory 
Mechanism 
IFA 2000 France 1986  
Moyle 500 Ireland
4
 2002  
BritNed 1000 Netherlands 2011  
EWIC 500 Ireland 2012  
ElecLink 1000 France 2019 Exempt 
NEMO 1000 Belgium 2019 Cap and floor 
NSN 1400 Norway 2020 Cap and floor 
IFA2 1000 France 2020 Cap and floor 
Greenlink 500 Ireland 2021 Cap and floor 
FAB Link 1400 France 2022 Cap and floor 
Viking 1000 Denmark 2022 Cap and floor 
 
 
The original intention was for interconnectors (or interconnected capacity) to be incorporated 
in some manner into the GB Capacity Auction. However, the complexity of determining the 
appropriate arrangements and legislation for doing so meant that they were excluded from 
bidding into the first auction. The EMR proposals for the first auction instead allowed for 
interconnection capacity to be incorporated into the target capacity and demand curve: 
 
³7KH H[SHFWHG FRQWULEXWLRQ IURP LQWHUFRQQHFWRUV ZLOO EH UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH DPRXQW RI
capacity auctioned. For example, if 2GW of imports are expected to be available at 
times of GB system stress, we will reduce the amount of capacity auctioned in the 
&DSDFLW\0DUNHWE\*:´ [17] 
 
                                                 
4
 More specifically, the Single Electricity Market (SEM) of Ireland, incorporating the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. The SEM is correlated on price to GB but includes capacity payments and totals to higher 
costs, so the net flow at peak is from GB to Ireland. This may change with the new market arrangements (iSEM) 
being developed in Ireland and the removal of constraints between the Republic and Northern Ireland. 
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However, in the first auction (2014 T-4), a conservative position on net flows at times of 
s\VWHPVWUHVVZDVUHFRPPHQGHGLQ1DWLRQDO*ULG¶VDVVHVVPHQW 
 
³«ZKLOHLQWHUFRQQHFWRUVFDQQRWSDUWLFLSDWHLQWKHDXFWLRQLWVHOIDFRQVHUYDWLYHYLHZ
should be adopted about the level of capacity they would provide during times when 
the system is under stress. Theoretically, if the UK energy system is under stress due to 
high demand and low supply, you would expect prices for energy to be higher in the 
UK and relatively lower in neighbouring countries, where the energy system might not 
be under stress. Interconnected capacity should therefore naturally flow onto our 
V\VWHPEXWRXURSHUDWLRQDOH[SHULHQFHWHOOVXVWKDWWKLVGRHVQRWDOZD\VKDSSHQ´[18] 
 
Once the CM had been further developed to accommodate interconnectors they were able to 
participate in the second auction (2015 T-4) [19], using de-rating factors calculated on behalf 
of '(&&XVLQJD³K\EULG´GH-rating approach [20], along with analysis of historical weather 
patterns and the modelling of the impact of interconnection on the Loss of Load Expectation 
[21]. This calculates the maximum average contribution to GB security of supply at times of 
system stress ± taking into account the likely flows between markets using historical market 
data applied to 4 future scenarios ± which is then adjusted to account for technical availability 
of the interconnector. The de-rating factors for the five eligible interconnectors are given in 
Table 2. Note the low de-rated value for the GB-Ireland interconnection, which reflects that 
the markets are highly correlated in terms of demand profiles and wind generation. 
 
Table 2 - 2015 T-4 Interconnector participation [20],[25] 
Project 2015 T-4 
Final de-
rating 
Participant in 
2015 T-4 
auction? 
Capacity Agreement 
awarded? 
IFA (France) 52% Yes Yes (1033.76MW) 
Eleclink (France) 56% No N/A 
BritNED (Netherlands) 69% Yes Yes (828MW) 
NEMO (Belgium) 54% Yes No 
Moyle and EWIC (Ireland) 6% No N/A 
 
 
 
AUCTION RESULTS TO DATE 
 
2014 T-4 
The first capacity auction, for delivery in 2018/19, was conducted on 16
th
-18
th
 December 
2014 and the results announced the following day [23]. 64.97GW of capacity entered the 
auction, with 49.26GW (75.8%) receiving Capacity Agreements at a clearing price of 
£19.40/kW, with a total cost of £0.99bn (in 2014 prices). The clearing price was significantly 
EHORZDQDO\VWV¶H[SHFWDWLRns, and almost 6GW of existing capacity failed to secure contracts 
[24]. 
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 Figure 2 - 2014 T-4 Auction demand and supply curves (reproduced from [23])  
 
2.6GW (5.3%) by capacity was awarded to 77 new-build units, and 0.17GW (0.36%) to 15 
Demand-Side Response (DSR) units. The remaining capacity was awarded to existing 
generators. 
 
Table 3 - 2014 T-4 Auction - Capacity awarded by technology [4] 
Technology Capacity (GW) Capacity (%) No. Units 
CCGT 22.3 45.2 47 
Coal/Biomass 9.2 18.7 29 
Nuclear 7.9 16.0 16 
CHP / autogeneration 4.2 8.6 36 
Storage 2.7 5.5 13 
OCGT / Reciprocating engines 2.1 4.3 121 
Hydro 0.7 1.4 29 
Demand-side Response 0.2 0.4 15 
 
 
2015 T-4 
The second capacity auction, for delivery in 2019/20, was conducted on 8
th
 ± 10th December 
2015 and the results announced the following day [25]. 57.72GW of capacity entered the 
auction, with 46.35GW (80.3%) receiving Capacity Agreements at a clearing price of 
£18.00/kW, with a total cost of £0.94bn (in 2015 prices). 
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Figure 3 - 2015 T-4 Auction demand and supply curves (reproduced from [25]) 
 
1.94GW (4.2%) by capacity was awarded to 74 new-build units, and 0.5GW (1.0%) to 23 
Demand-Side Response (DSR) units. 
 
Table 4 - 2015 T-4 Auction - Capacity awarded by technology [5] 
Technology Capacity (GW) Capacity (%) No. Units  
CCGT 21.8 47.1 48 
Nuclear 7.6 16.3 16 
Coal/biomass 4.7 10.1 24 
CHP / autogeneration 4.2 9.1 43 
Storage 2.6 5.7 15 
OCGT / Reciprocating engines 2.4 2.4 5.2 
Interconnector 1.9 4.0 2 
Hydro 0.7 1.5 33 
Demand-side Response 0.5 1.0 24 
 
One new-build interconnector (the 1GW NEMO LINK between GB and Belgium) offered 
540MW of capacity but exited the auction prior to clearing. 
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MARKET DISTORTIONS AND HARMONISATION 
 
There are two types of cross-border distortions in markets resulting from local capacity 
mechanisms [4]. Firstly, static short-term distortions affect whether prices reflect the cost of 
production and hence whether the production of electricity is least-cost effective. If a capacity 
mechanism does not adequately consider non-domestic generation capacity, then wholesale 
distortions will arise. If a generator receives payments which affect their electricity generation 
bids into the market, and generators in a neighbouring energy-only market do not receive such 
payments, then this will alter the ability of generators in neighbouring markets to directly 
compete on price.   
 
Secondly, there may be dynamic distortions which impact generation investment decisions. 
Capacity mechanisms may even become the main driver for investments in new electricity 
generation capacity, rather than energy prices, as has been demonstrated in modelling of the 
potential impact of a capacity mechanism in the German market [26]. 
 
Other cross-border effects have also been identified [27]: 
 
x A decrease in peak prices, due to a solely energy-based remuneration being replaced 
with two-part payments to generators for energy and capacity, meaning that the 
µPLVVLQJPRQH\¶SUREOHP (where market prices do not adequately represent scarcity 
value and so are insufficient to stimulate investment in new-build capacity) may be in 
part exported as generators in neighbouring markets cannot benefit from price spikes 
in the market with the Capacity Mechanism; 
x Impacts on capacity, due to additional investments being triggered in regions with a 
Capacity Mechanism at the possible expense of investment decisions in neighbouring 
markets; 
x $µIUHH-ULGLQJ¶HIIHFWZKHUHE\DQLQFUHDVHLQJHQHration capacity in a market with a 
Capacity Mechanism leads to a smaller increase in available capacity in a 
neighbouring market due to their interconnection, despite consumers in the second 
market not having to pay for that capacity; 
x A reduction in infrastructure investment due to reduced trade leading to lower 
congestion rents; 
x A redistribution of surpluses between generators and consumers leading to a possible 
decrease in total welfare. 
 
Because a country has no control over generation at the other end of an interconnector there 
has been a default methodology which assumes that interconnectors do not make any 
contribution to national security of supply [6], and this appears to have been the case for the 
exclusion of interconnectors from the first GB capacity auction. While subsequent auction 
rounds have and will include de-rated interconnector capacity, the non-inclusion of 
interconnection capacity in the first auction round could potentially have reduced the future 
space accorded to interconnectors (or demand side response). However, as only a small 
volume of contracts were given extending beyond the first year of delivery, this is unlikely to 
have been significant in practice. 
 
There are 3 main determinants of a shortfall of capacity in western European markets: the 
level of peak demand, failures of conventional plant, and the availability of intermittent 
generation. The chances that each of these could occur simultaneously in two or more 
neighbouring countries is hence low, and the role of interconnection is enhanced by the 
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market coupling increasing responsiveness of flows to price differentials, so that imports 
should occur through cross-border signals in response to all but very short-term fluctuations. 
However, while GB is currently interconnected to 3 different markets (France, Netherlands 
and Ireland), and in the future to 3 additional markets (Belgium, Norway and Denmark), 
continental Europe will increasingly become one market and so the correlations between GB 
and neighbouring markets (in terms of pricing) can be expected to change. 
 
Modelling work [28] commissioned by the GB Regulator during the design of the Capacity 
Mechanism design process indicate that low system margins (less than 20%) in GB show a 
medium level of correlation with low system margins in Ireland and France, but very low 
system margins (less than 10%) do not show a definite correlation with any of the other 
systems. However, there are a small number of historical datapoints from which to assess this, 
and it is conceivable that there could be mechanisms (such as extreme weather events) which 
might lead to very low margin periods in neighbouring countries at the same time. Similar 
work [29] on modelling stress events showed that interconnectors could be expected to 
deliver flows of electricity at times of high stress and reduce unserved energy. Clearly, then, 
the value of interconnection needs to be recognised within a national capacity mechanism in 
order to avoid over-procurement of local capacity at significant cost to the consumer, but the 
question remains of the optimal methodology for harmonising interconnection with a capacity 
mechanism to avoid distortions in cross-border energy trading. Increasing transmission 
capacity under asymmetric market designs may even serve to magnify existing distortions 
[30].  
 
A further concern is that if an interconnector is itself bidding into a capacity mechanism (such 
as in the GB 2015 T-4 auction), then how is it ensured that the capacity expected to be 
µDYDLODEOH¶LVDFWXDOO\VRZKHQLWLVQHHGHG? There are several ways to reflect this obligation 
[31]: 
 
1. The interconnector must actually deliver energy in the required direction of system 
stress; 
2. The interconnector must be available to deliver energy in the required direction of 
system stress, but actual flows may depend on generator behaviour; 
3. The interconnector carries no obligation in either availability or delivery. 
 
The latter case was implemented in the 2015 T-4 auction, with the de-rated capacities of each 
interconnector (as determined by the modelled correlations between each market) used in the 
auction to represent the risk of each not delivering energy when required. 
 
Mechanisms for Harmonisation and Enablement of Competition across Borders 
 
There are a number of means by which the joint goals of national generation adequacy and 
EU market harmonisation may be achieved together. 
 
Firstly, the actual cross-border exchange of capacity could be permitted ± that is, generators in 
neighbouring markets are allowed to bid for capacity within the mechanism. This would 
ensure the competitive benefits of cross-border trading in energy are extended into capacity, 
and reduce overall costs. However, this would introduce several complexities ± a mechanism 
would be required to assess and certify foreign capacity and to determine its effective 
contribution taking into account transmission constraints, and to ensure that the foreign 
capacity is making the same effective provision as local participants. Further, the generation 
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capacity would need to be matched by a firm transmission capacity across the interconnector. 
It would also be necessary to ensure that there were no other market distortions present 
between the markets. In the specific case of GB, the carbon price floor contributes to 
wholesale prices being significantly higher than in continental Europe. Network charging, 
renewable subsidies and taxation of generation and supply would also need to be harmonised 
to prevent distortions. 
 
If a proportion of cross-border transmission capacity is reserved for this purpose, then this 
would limit the efficiency of cross-border energy trading. If the generator is instead required 
to purchase transmission rights to demonstrate an ability to deliver capacity, then while this 
would be more compatible with the EU target model for capacity allocation, this could lead to 
netted flows being inverted where both markets are capacity scarce and the provision of 
capacity is in opposition to the flow of traded energy. Similarly, the requirement to provide 
matched transmission capacity with generation capacity could be ignored under the 
assumption that cross-border flows are optimised, and prices should reflect scarcity, ensuring 
the flow is in the correct direction, but this may not occur under all conditions and would be 
dependent on Capacity Mechanisms between neighbouring countries being aligned. If 
capacity allocation is ignored, then there is no effective improvement upon the current 
methodology of taking into account the statistical contribution of interconnection rather than 
considering particular foreign generators ± indeed, under such a mechanism where the 
transmission capacity is determined by the price-based flow, a foreign generator not 
participating in the Mechanism would be contributing to security of supply as much as one 
which was participating. 
 
In addition, if a generator is able to access neighbouring markets, then they may be able to 
simultaneously bid capacity into more than one market. This could prove problematic if that 
generator is called to deliver in more than one market simultaneously. This could be removed 
via appropriate regulation, or alternatively viewed as a risk by the market operator which can 
be ameliorated through the use of de-rated capacities, similar to the current treatment of 
interconnectors in the GB Capacity Auction. Similarly, there is the question of whether 
transmission rights in the future purchased by a generator in one market entitles it to access 
the entire harmonised EU transmission system or only their domestic market ± should the 
market harmonisation extend to the point where interconnectors are treated equitably as 
elements of the transmission network rather than separate entities with separate access rights? 
  
Expanding the terms of the auction to include cross-border participation would not, however, 
address the issue that differing incentives between markets could lead to an implicit 
competition of national Capacity Mechanisms among each other, which may shift the 
generation mix away from the optimum, if viewed at a pan-European level [32]. A second 
approach would be to harmonise and coordinate national capacity mechanisms under a single 
design. However, with many different Capacity Mechanisms already in place, others being 
implemented, and a difference in generation backgrounds creating different drivers for design 
of those mechanisms, it seems unlikely that a single design would be appropriate across all 
Member States. It does not appear that such a common design is a current focus of the EU 
Commission. Local market designs may also reflect local physical adequacy in a more 
efficient manner. 
 
Taking this idea further, a single EU-wide capacity mechanism could be enacted, as capacity 
installed solely to cope with scarcity in each individual market area leads to overcapacity seen in 
the European context. In [33], a nodal pricing market design across Europe is proposed 
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(similar to that currently enacted within NordPool), where security is shifted away from 
regional operators (TSOs) towards centralised management. This approach appears to lead to 
an increase in transfers between countries due to more efficient use of interconnection 
capacity, but would obviously entail major institutional changes. However, systemic 
deviations away from the reference price at a node would provide a clear locational signal for 
power plant investment, in principle obviating the long-term need for separate capacity 
payments.  
 
ENTSO-E does not advocate a radical change in the governance framework for security of 
supply in Europe, but proposes that national markets integrate in a local manner [34]. 
EURELECTRIC has proposed a roadmap to a European capacity market in which the 
development of national Capacity Mechanisms, and their regional coordination, form the 
interim steps over the next decade [35]. However there remains a wider question over whether 
Capacity Mechanisms will endure as an appropriate means of tackling the growing question 
of security of supply against the aims of decarbonisation and, if the energy-only market is 
currently incapable of delivering adequate capacity, whether more fundamental redesign of 
European electricity markets ± capable of incorporating new sources of flexibility and 
reliability ± may provide a more efficient solution [36]. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the absence of a clear EU-level roadmap to the alignment of national Capacity 
Mechanisms, any resolution of the conflict between the GB Capacity Market and the EU 
Single Market must be resolved through the redesign of that national market. While the 
eligibility of interconnectors in the GB 2015 T-4 auction could be regarded as an 
improvement on their exclusion from the 2014 T-4 auction, the inability of cross-border 
generation to explicitly participate is likely to continue to cause ongoing distortions in both 
the short-term dispatch of generation and long-term patterns of generation investment. 
However, the participation of generators across interconnectors raises further issues in both 
the certification of foreign generators and the efficient allocation of interconnector capacity 
without raising further market distortions. It also implies the need for EU-wide generation 
adequacy assessments and harmonisation of other elements which can distort the market, such 
as renewable subsidies. If these can be resolved, then such regional coordination of capacity 
markets with situation-specific cross-border trading arrangements could provide the interim 
steps towards a wider single EU capacity market and greater efficiency in addressing security 
of supply concerns across Europe as a whole. 
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